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The recognition of uncertainty as a pivotal issue for the sociology of
medicine is longstanding. More recently, the widespread integration of
newmedical technologies into healthcare has led to a renewed analytic
focus on uncertainty. However, there remains little work on the inter-
actional manifestations of uncertainty. This article uses conversation
analysis to examine how uncertainty is introduced and used in one spe-
cific setting: an antenatal screening clinic in Hong Kong. We focus on
women who have received ‘‘screen positive’’ or higher risk results, and
reflect on theways inwhich uncertainty is an ‘‘essential tension’’ (Maze-
land and ten Have 1996) in the activity of conveying these results to
them. We conclude that as well as posing potential difficulties for inter-
action, the uncertainty of test results is also used here as an interactional
resource inmanaging the institutionally defined category of ‘‘high risk.’’
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INTRODUCTION
The recognition of uncertainty as a pivotal issue for the sociology of medicine
is longstanding. As Davis (1960) notes, the identification of its importance can
be traced back to Parsons (1951), who describes it as a primary source of strain
in the doctor’s role. This strain arises for two reasons: not only does it obscure
definitive diagnoses and prognoses, but it also poses major issues for doctor/patient
communication. In her analysis of how medical students are socialized, Fox (1957)
distinguishes two aspects of uncertainty: the limitations of medical knowledge itself,
and the limitations of any one individual’s mastery of that knowledge. In other words,
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there is a limit to what is known, and there is also a limit to what each doctor can
know of what is known. As a result, Fox argues that a key skill for aspiring doctors
is learning to manage these limitations. Davis (1960) develops this analysis further.
He makes a distinction between uncertainty as a clinical and scientific phenomenon
(what he calls ‘‘real’’ uncertainty, for example where existing medical knowledge
does not allow a diagnosis to be found), and the uses to which uncertainty may be put
in the management of patients (what he calls ‘‘functional’’ uncertainty). Davis notes
that the uncertainty in this latter case may be either real or pretend, but invoking it
serves a function for the clinician, for example, in promoting a particular course of
action or treatment. He argues that doctors, as a matter of professional obligation,
routinely seek to narrow the range of uncertainty for the patients they deal with.
More recently, the increased integration of new medical technologies into health-
care has led to a renewed analytic focus on uncertainty. More recent work by Fox
(1980, 2000) has gone so far as to argue that as technologies increase our ability to
test and measure, the lack of clarity over what such results should be taken to signify
means that uncertainty is becoming the hallmark of medicine. The consequences of
this for patients has been speculated upon, with Timmermans and Angell (2001:356)
suggesting that a perceived inadequacy of evidence might in fact lead to a greater
validation of ‘‘humanistic concerns,’’ concentrating the focus on what is best in
the context of a particular patient’s circumstances. They also, however, cite the
view of Katz (1984), a psychiatrist who argues that propelled by uncertainty, the
pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction, and that strategies doctors
have developed for coping with uncertainty lead them either to disregard or avoid it.
It is clear, then, that foundational medical sociological studies have recognized
the inevitable impact of uncertainty on doctor/patient communication. While these
studies provide a solid basis for investigating uncertainty, they have, however,
largely ignored the ways in which uncertain information is actually introduced and
negotiated in everyday healthcare practices through talk. Although predictions have
been made about how interactions are likely to be affected, empirical investigations
into how uncertainty is talked with and about are relatively rare.
In this article, we focus on talking with and about uncertainty in one specific
context: explaining test results in antenatal screening. Antenatal screening is a
service provided to pregnant women to identify the possibility of conditions affecting
the fetus. Our interest in this setting is twofold. First, while antenatal screening has
been the target of considerable sociological scrutiny in the last twenty years (Reid
et al. 2009), it has not received much scrutiny from an interactional perspective.
Second, antenatal screening provides a particularly interesting site for investigating
uncertainty, as it raises a further issue of accuracy, in that the limitations of the tests
themselves are well documented (e.g., Bewley et al. 1995; Driscoll 2003; Meier et al.
2002). Pregnant women and clinic personnel thus face a double uncertainty: not
only do screening tests produce uncertain answers which are expressed in the form
of probabilities or risk factors, but those results themselves are also of uncertain
reliability. Antenatal screening, then, is an illustration of Fox’s (2000) argument that
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uncertainty is becoming the hallmark of medicine. What this means practically is
that clinicians dealing with these results have no recourse to any greater professional
knowledge; it is not simply that they do not know with any certainty what the results
mean, but that no one could know. Greater certainty about the results cannot be
obtained unless invasive diagnostic testing, which carries a risk of miscarriage, is
undertaken. Even then, there is no test that can detect all fetal abnormalities and
some abnormalities, especially those of a nongenetic nature, can only be discovered
at birth (Lee, Leung, and Tang 2009; Tang, Ghosh, and Chan 1991). The inescapable
presence of uncertainty in this setting is a critical issue for both research and practice.
As Maynard and Frankel (2006) note, a tendency for interactional research to be
preoccupied with bad news delivery ‘‘has meant that other kinds of diagnoses, such
as those that are . . . uncertain have received virtually no study’’ (248). An inevitable
consequence is that there is not much of a basis upon which medical professionals
can build standards of practice.
This article aims to go some small way to redressing this by using conversation
analysis to examine how uncertainty features in consultations with women who
have previously undergone screening tests for fetal abnormalities and have received
‘‘screen positive’’ or higher risk results (falling outside an officially set ‘‘normal’’
range). Both the ‘‘normal’’ and the ‘‘screen positive’’ estimates are probabilistic
rather than certain. Women who screen positive receive a telephone call inviting
them to return to the hospital. This means that they can infer they are at higher risk
before they arrive, since those whose results are deemed ‘‘normal’’ are not recalled
in this way. However, they do not receive their actual results until they arrive at
the clinic. These ‘‘screen positive’’ women are then seen by an obstetrician or an
obstetric nurse to discuss both their results and the possibility of further diagnostic
testing. In this article, we examine the ways in which uncertainty is talked both with
(in relation to the results) and about (in relation to the tests themselves). We aim
to show how uncertainty is not only a topic for discussion but also an interactional
resource to be drawn on by participants.
RISK COMMUNICATION AND THE DELIVERY OF
DIAGNOSTIC NEWS
In this article, we draw on sociological, psychological, and discourse-based studies
that focus on broader issues of risk communication, particularly in relation to the
framing of risk information that provide a backdrop for our discussion of how
uncertainty is talked with and about in this context. We also discuss conversation
analytic studies that focus on diagnostic news delivery (that may include test results)
as an interactional event in the context of primary care.
Previous research has ascertained that the ways in which risk is framed may
have a significant impact on the clients’ understanding of their risk status and their
subsequent decision-making (e.g., Hallowell et al. 1997; Marteau 1989; Michie and
Marteau 1996; O’Doherty and Suthers 2007; Welkenhuysen, Evers-Kiebooms, and
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d’ Ydewalle 2001). One way of framing risk information is through a numeric presen-
tation of a probability of a genetic condition, which has been shown to be a preferred
format among professionals. This has been attributed to the impression of precision
that numeric representations give to risk estimates, which allow professionals to
maintain their authority in the face of uncertainty (Lobb and Gaff 2010). Clients,
however, have been reported to have difficulties in understanding abstract/absolute
risk presentations and to strongly prefer individualized risk assessments (for an
overview see Sivell et al. 2008). Some studies that have compared numeric versus
verbal formats of risk presentation have shown that clients display a better under-
standing of the latter (Marteau et al. 2000) and that they are more likely to take up
genetic testing when presented with numeric risk information (Wilson, Ferguson,
and Thorn 2011). What these studies have highlighted is that there is no one-to-one
correspondence of specific numeric formats and particular verbal expressions of risk
and that there is great variability in how risk can be framed. They have not, however,
specifically addressed talk around uncertainty as a topic in its own right.
Discourse-based studies of genetic counseling have addressed both the issues
of the framing of risk information and the management of uncertainty (Sarangi
2002, Sarangi and Clarke 2002; Sarangi et al. 2003). Sarangi and Clarke (2002)
note that uncertainty in genetic counseling is manifested through hedging devices
that may include, for example, various auxiliaries (e.g., might, may); adverbs (e.g.,
approximately, probably), and may be followed by illustrations and disclaimers
(e.g., ‘‘I am not a neurosurgeon’’). While this work is useful in highlighting specific
interactional features associated with uncertainty, it also highlights a key difference
between genetic counseling for hereditary disorders and the less specialized process
of antenatal screening. As Sarangi and Clarke (2002) describe, in genetic counseling
uncertainty is largely related to the limitations of the current state of knowledge in
genetics. In their study this uncertainty impinges on diagnosis and the boundaries
of uncertainty can be managed by referring the client to a different sort of specialist
with a different sort of knowledge (in their case, a neurologist). In antenatal
screening, however, as we have already noted, there is no such recourse to a
different professional knowledge base and no possibility of a diagnosis being made
purely on the basis of a screening test.
Given the imperfect fit with the literature on genetic counseling for our context,
we have also drawn on studies of primary healthcare contexts in situating our
analysis. In particular, there is a body of conversation analytic work that deals with
diagnosis delivery, examining how diagnostic information is framed and explained
(e.g., Maynard 1991, 2006; Maynard and Frankel 2003, 2006; Pera¨kyla¨ 1998, 2006).
Again, there are important differences between the two contexts, notably that a
definitive diagnosis in primary care is likely to be more readily available. In addition,
in our specific screening context, women are aware that a recall to the clinic indicates
a high risk result, though they are not given the numerical formulation—the
actual result—prior to their visit. Despite these differences though, these studies
shed important light on how diagnostic news delivery is organized as an interactional
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event. Maynard (2006), for example, describes how in a primary care context, doctors
normally announce news and then follow this announcement with an elaboration of
this news, which gives the patient some indication of how it should be interpreted.
He describes a news delivery sequence in which doctors begin by citing or explicating
the evidence, which is frequently, as is the case in our data, a test result. This is often
done as a first turn announcement and is generally followed by a proposal of what
that announcement means. Meaning-making, then, is commonly seen as part and
parcel of diagnostic activity, following directly from the announcement of the result.
Pera¨kyla¨ (1998, 2006) notes that, in Finnish primary care encounters, doctors tend
to explicate the diagnosis in four particular circumstances: when the diagnosis is
temporally detached from the physical examination; when the examination process
is not clear to the patient; when there is uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis;
and when the doctor and the patient have different ideas about the diagnosis. His
findings that explication is linked to uncertainty are an empirical demonstration of
the arguments put forward by Parsons (1951), Fox (1957), and Davis (1960) about
the impact of uncertainty on doctor–patient communication. What remains unclear,
however, is the extent to which these findings transfer to a setting such as antenatal
screening, in which uncertainty is an inescapable component of the test results.
DATA ANDMETHODS
This research is part of a large interactional study of antenatal screening in Hong
Kong, on-going since 2006, which involves a close collaboration between the research
team at the Universities of Hong Kong and Nottingham, and a Prenatal Diagnostics
and Counseling Department of one public hospital.
As we have previously described (Pilnick and Zayts 2012), the Hong Kong
healthcare system is divided into public and private health sectors and patients can
choose care from either sector, or to combine the two. Public hospitals have no
catchment area and so patients may choose to attend any hospital. Research has
found that 80% of Hong Kong residents prefer the private sector to public health
care (Improving Hong Kong’s Healthcare System 2009) and in many scenarios those
accessing public health care tend to be those for whom private care is unaffordable.
The hospital where the data were collected, however, represents an unusual case. It
is a teaching/training hospital for a medical faculty of one of the universities in Hong
Kong and as a result has extensive facilities and a substantial number of professorial
staff. The University also subsidizes the services that are provided. The unusual
nature of this public hospital means that it does not only attract a ‘‘typical’’ public
clientele; while it still serves patients with low monthly incomes and with chronic
illnesses who require frequent medical visits, it is also popular among higher income
families because of its high reputation and facilities.
In the study site, as with other public hospitals in Hong Kong, antenatal screening
is provided by obstetricians or obstetric nurses as part of routine antenatal services.1
The screening is organized as a four-stage activity, though women may opt out at any
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point and many women will take part in only the first two stages. First, women are
introduced to the process through information leaflets and a 15-min video outlining
the nature of Down’s syndrome,2 the available screening and diagnostic tests and
some psychosocial aspects of screening. This video is watched in a private room on
hospital premises and is followed by a face-to-face meeting with the hospital staff in
which the information from the leaflets and the video and the woman’s prescreening
personal risks (typically maternal age and family history) are discussed. Women
can then choose to undergo screening. Those women who opt to undergo screening
and who receive a ‘‘high-risk’’ or ‘‘positive’’ screening report receive a phone call
inviting them for a follow-up consultation, in which the option of amniocentesis and
the timescale for a decision are discussed. If a client chooses amniocentesis, another
consultation is scheduled if Down’s syndrome is diagnosed to explain the diagnosis
and to discuss subsequent management.
In this article, as in previously published work (Pilnick and Zayts 2012), our focus
is on a particular group of women who have undergone initial antenatal screening
procedures and have received high-risk results (in this setting a result of greater than
1 in 250 for the first or second trimester screening tests, and greater than 1 in 320
for the integrated test).3 Hospital records show that between 2007 and 2009, 2062
women received antenatal screening services. The number of women receiving high
risk results was 299 (11.5%). This is a higher proportion than would be expected in
the general population and may be attributed to the fact that women≥ 35 years were
initially the target population for the screening, and these women have a higher risk
of fetal abnormalities in comparison to younger women (Tang et al. 1991). Statistics
for the period beginning July 2010, when screening was introduced for women of all
ages, are not yet available. Of the 299 women, 145 (49%) opted for amniocentesis
and the rest declined further testing. As we have noted elsewhere (Pilnick and Zayts
2012) this high declination rate is anecdotally attributed by medical staff to the fact
that a significant proportion of these women are migrant workers who leave Hong
Kong during their pregnancy.
The overall data set currently comprises 120 video recorded consultations. The
subset used in this article, women receiving high risk results with consultations
conducted in English, currently consists of twenty consultations each of approxi-
mately fifteen minutes in length. Consultations in this setting are scheduled fifteen
minute apart, since providing antenatal screening services is only one aspect of
obstetric provision the staff conducting the consultations are involved in. Ethics
committee approval was obtained from both the University of Hong Kong and
a Hospital Authority cluster overseeing the hospital where the data were col-
lected. The recruitment procedure involved a study nurse approaching potential
participants and introducing the research project to them before seeking consent to
participate. The background of the recruited participants reflects the diversity of the
client population at this particular hospital. Women originate from various parts of
Asia (Hong Kong, Mainland China, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia), North
and South America, Europe, New Zealand, and Australia. Their socioeconomic
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background also ranges widely, from women employed as domestic workers to those
in professional occupations. The age of the participants is from 35 to 41 years old.
Consultations in the clinic were conducted by four medical professionals (three
doctors and one nurse), all of whom are Hong Kong Chinese and all of whom
participated in this study. In the extracts that we have selected for this article,
three doctors participate (who are referred to as D1, D2, and D3 in the transcripts;
pregnant women and their husbands are referred to as W and H, respectively). In
the consultations, either English or Cantonese are used as the first or the second
language of the participants. While one of our research interests is in conducting a
comparative analysis of consultations conducted in English and Cantonese, for the
purposes of this article only English language consultations have been included. The
analysis was conducted using conversation analysis, and extracts reproduced here
employ standard CA transcription notation (ten Have 2007; Jefferson, as published
in Atkinson and Heritage 1984).
FINDINGS
Conveying Results: Rendering Numbers Uncertain
Results from the screening tests are generated as a risk factor—‘‘1 in X’’—where
anything greater than 1 in 250 (or 1 in 320 for the integrated test) is considered in this
setting to be high risk or (to use the official term) ‘‘screen positive.’’ Women who have
been invited back to discuss their results can therefore infer that they fall into this cat-
egory, and the information leaflet given at the outset of the process makes this clear,
but the actual risk factor is not given to them until the face to face appointment. Occa-
sionally, the information which is given to pregnant women in these consultations
does not go beyond this kind of numerical formulation, as the example below shows:
Extract 15 
Context: The woman is a Filipina. She is 35 years old, and her risk is estimated at 1:235. She
is employed as a domestic worker in Hong Kong and attends the consultation on her own.     
 
1. D1: So (name) (.)  you understand that um we
2.  tell you before the .h we told you before 
3.  that the blood test (.) comes back e: to be 
4.  uh positive 
5. W:  Yeh.= 
6. D1: =That means the Down Syndrome 
7.  screening test is positive (.) Em ití s about  
8.  em (0.2) one em: The- the risk is about (.)
9.  the- the risk is about mm: one in two hundred thirty five (.)  
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10.  . hh yeah, that means in two hundred and four- 
11.  thirty four babies will be normal. (.) And eh:  
12.  ah one of the- out of the two hundred 
13.  twenty five could be having the Down syndrome 
14.  (0.5) ((W nods slightly in response to gaze of physician))    
15.  D1: .hh Okay? To- to confirm whether there is- 
16.   your baby is eh Down syndrome or not (.) 
17.   so we need to put a needle in
18.   ((W nods)) 
In this extract the risk is presented numerically as 1 in 235. This presentation
occurs over lines 7–9, and is produced after hitches, perturbations and restarts which
suggest some difficulty in producing the actual number, and according to Sarangi and
Clarke (2002), some uncertainty over this result. While there is clearly interactional
delicacy here, there may however be alternative explanations to that offered by
Sarangi and Clarke, such as the difficulty in delivering bad news. However, we note
that the numerical formulation is softened by the use of the word ‘‘about’’ directly
beforehand: though the paper from which the doctor reads contains a precise number,
the doctor diminishes this precision, and hence the certainty, in his presentation.
The doctor continues his turn in lines 10–13 to explain this number as a population
risk, by extrapolating it to a context wider than this pregnancy. In this extrapolation,
the term ‘‘could’’ is used (line 13), rather than the evidential ‘‘would,’’ which also
emphasizes uncertainty. As previous studies in genetic counseling contexts have
noted, clients may face difficulties in understanding their risk status presented to
them in generic formats such as these, and report a preference for individualized
risk assessments (Sivell et al. 2008). In this particular example, the pregnant woman
does not respond immediately to the doctor’s utterance, and gives a slight nod only
when the doctor holds her gaze, which would suggest that she anticipates further
talk from him. However, in contrast to Maynard’s (2006) work and to examples we
will subsequently examine, no further ‘‘meaning making’’ of the results occurs in
this instance. Instead, the doctor produces a proposal for confirmation of the results
through diagnostic testing (and therefore achieving certainty), using the imperative
formulation ‘‘we need’’ in line 17.
Another factor worthy of note in this extract is the extremely minimal nature of
the pregnant woman’s responses. As we will see in subsequent extracts, such minimal
responses are by no means unusual in these data, which may at first glance seem
surprising. These responses, however, are in line with the way patients typically
respond to the diagnostic phase of GP consultations (e.g., Heath 1992, Pera¨kyla¨
1998; 2006), where there is also often a reluctance to give any extended response.
We will return to this issue later in the article.
We should note that this kind of presentation which contains only the citing of the
risk factor and population risk is relatively rare in the data (two out of twenty cases).
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More usually, the doctor or nurse makes some attempt to go beyond a quantitative
figure, and to also give some qualitative explanation of how this figure may be
understood or what it means. Such qualitative explanations also invoke uncertainty.
An example of this can be found in Extract 2.
Making Meaning from Uncertainty
Extract 2
Context: The woman is a Filipina, she is 35 years old, and her risk is 1:200. She is employed  
as a domestic worker and attends the consultation on her own.The consultation is conducted  
in English, which is a second language for both participants. 
1. D2: Screen positive. (.) Okay? But no. (.) Don’t be too worry, (.) okay? 
2.  .h um nah, there are two um problems with the result. 
3.  Um:m  one is the mm: AFP is: a bit high Okay? 
4.  ((looking at W)) [this is Alpha fe ]toprotein. 
5. W:   [°>What is it mean?<] Okay° 
6. D2:  I’ll explain to you, okay?  
7.  (0.2)
8. D2: The other is the .h HCG (.) which is the  
9.  placental hormone (.) which is also a bit high, okay?  
10. W: °Umm.° 
11. D2: .h if we base on these blood test result and   
12.  your age=  
13. W: °Um hmm.° 
14. D2: =to calculate the chance that your baby have  
15.  Down syndrome= 
16. W: °Um hmm.° 
17. D2: =The chance that the baby have Down  
18.  syndrome is (.) about one in two hundred. 
19. W: °(exclaims in Tagalog)°, okay. 
20. D2: Okay? Not- not a very high [risk.] 
21. W:    [Yeh,] °I know.° ((while nodding))  
22. D2: So it’s:: sort of less than point five percent  
23. W: °Yeh.° [°Yes. Sure.°] 
24. D2:  [So less than] one percent 
25. W: Yeh, yeah, 
26. D2: Okay? 
27.  ((W nods))
28. D2: .h so um it’s up to you. (.) We- we- we still  
29.  call it screen positive because there is a small  
30.  possibility that the baby might have Downs
31. W: Um hmm
32. D2: Em but it’s up to you whether you want the   
33.  amniocentesis emm to check if [the baby] has Downs 
34. W:   
35.  to put inside?  
36. D2: Yes. (.) Yes ((while nodding)) 
[is it the  ] (.) the one
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Once again, this extract begins with confirmation of the woman’s official status
at the clinic—‘‘screen positive.’’ Despite this official categorization and before the
actual test results are delivered she is immediately given a degree of reassurance (But
no. (.) Don’t be too worry (.) Okay?, line 1). This reassurance appears to be linked to
the woman’s reaction immediately as she enters the consultation in the few moments
before the sound on the video recording begins where she clasps her hand to her face,
indicating an emotional reaction. Maynard (2006) notes how in cases where patients
show emotional reactivity to news, affirming positive aspects of it and disconfirming
negative aspects are ubiquitous devices which respond to this reactivity. The doctor’s
continued turn then begins to separate the two different blood test components of
the calculation on which the risk figure is based, delivering the first part over lines
3–4. The woman’s initial question in line 5 is an insert expansion (Schegloff 2007); it
signifies that there are matters of understanding to be dealt with before the sequence
can continue and she can align as a recipient of this news, though it is unclear at this
stage whether the expansion required is the specific meaning of the term ‘‘AFP’’ or
the wider meaning of the results. This question overlaps with the doctor’s expansion
of the term ‘‘AFP’’ and the woman then produces the receipt marker ‘‘okay,’’ though
the doctor’s subsequent utterance, ‘‘I’ll explain to you, okay’’ seems to indicate the
hearing of a wider need. The second component of the results is then delivered over
lines 8–9, receiving a minimal acknowledgement. As in line 3, where the grading
particle ‘‘a bit’’ is used to moderate the presentation of the high finding in relation to
AFP levels, so in lines 8–9 the HCG level is described in the same way. The use of
these particles seems to index that, although there is a problem here in the sense of
‘‘screening positive,’’ the import of this result is not yet settled. Alongside the prior
exhortation ‘‘Don’t be too worry,’’ they work to counter assumptions the patient
could be held to be making, given her emotional reaction. The doctor then presents
the overall result as a ‘‘1 in x’’ figure (about one in two hundred, line 18). Once again,
although the results print out from which the doctor takes the information gives a
definitive risk factor (1 in 200), this is transformed by the doctor into something
less certain, an estimate, through the use of the mitigator ‘‘about.’’ The woman’s
utterance in response to this is minimal, is partly in Tagalog, her native language,
and is followed immediately by the doctor’s qualitative assessment that this is ‘‘not a
very high risk’’ (line 20). Again, the negation contained in this assessment counters
any implicit assumptions that might be made about a ‘‘screen positive’’ result. In
giving this assessment the doctor draws on the notion of range (Sarangi 2002), which
situates this specific risk in the context of the doctor’s wider knowledge of risk factors
and thus reduces its impact (Michie et al. 2003). In this instance, then, the news
delivery sequence is followed by an explication of what this news means. In response
to this assessment, the response from the woman is once again not extensive (line
21). The doctor follows this up in lines 22–24 by producing what O’Doherty and
Suthers 2007 refer to as a ‘‘loss framing’’ (411), where the risk factor is converted
to a percentage chance of the undesired event occurring, but where in this instance
such framing serves to emphasize its unlikely nature. Notably, this framing is still
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approximate, and avoids attributing a precise percentage chance. Over the course of
this extract, then, we have moved from an opening statement that conveys potential
problems—the woman’s result is ‘‘screen positive’’—to a position where the risk
is subsequently framed both qualitatively and quantitatively as both uncertain and
small. Again, this is minimally acknowledged by the woman over lines 23–27. This
apparent contradiction—of ‘‘screen positive’’ versus ‘‘not very high risk’’ is itself
addressed in lines 28–30, where the doctor offers an explanation of why it is still
classed as screen positive, i.e., how the official status relates to the context in which
she has placed the result. This is also linked to uncertainty, because although on the
one hand the woman has been told not to worry, the result cannot rule out a ‘‘small
possibility.’’ Amniocentesis is then topicalized as an option (lines 32–33).
As we have noted in the analysis of this extract above, the way in which the
doctor provides her account of the results orients to the emotional reaction of the
pregnant woman. Uncertainty is actively displayed by the doctor in this consultation,
and provides a resource for dealing with this emotion by minimizing the problem
that has been presented. While such emotional displays do not always feature in
this setting, a tendency to use uncertainty as a minimizing resource is much more
widespread. In his analysis of diagnostic news delivery, Maynard (2006) identifies the
phenomenon of ‘‘auspicious interpretation’’ (1905), so that even where news is bad
clinicians tend to produce interpretative proposals which emphasize the positive.
The transforming of the 1 in 200 to ‘‘not a very high risk’’ and ‘‘less than one
per cent’’ are examples of this auspicious interpretation, but here have the added
mitigation of uncertainty. In other words, there are good interactional reasons for
the way in which the test results are delivered in this extract. The corollary to this,
however, and what we see by comparing Extracts 1 and 2, is that the meaning
supplied by clinicians, and hence the proposed way of dealing with uncertainty, is
not necessarily objectively derivable from the test results. In Extract 1 the risk is
presented as an estimate of 1 in 235, yet it is apparently assumed that amniocentesis
will automatically be necessary in order to confirm what the results leave uncertain.
In Extract 2, the woman’s risk is a more likely estimate—about 1 in 200—but this
estimate is qualitatively described as ‘‘not very high’’ and amniocentesis is presented
as a possible option which could be chosen if the woman wishes to address the
‘‘small possibility’’ of Down’s. In other words, uncertainty is used to two different
ends in these two consultations; in the former it is used as a rationale for further
testing (‘‘uncertain results must be confirmed’’), and in the latter it is used to suggest
there may be no problem (‘‘uncertain results can be discounted’’). This contrasting
presentation highlights the difficulties of an ‘‘official’’ threshold which is applied to
everyone for screening positive, and also the way in which meaning assessment by
doctors may attempt to personalize this (see Silverman (2007) for a similar discussion
in relation to HIV testing and ‘‘people in a high risk class’’). It also begins to show
how uncertainty in this setting is not just an issue to talk about, but also an issue to
talk with; an interactional resource that can be drawn on to support quite different
interpretations of ‘‘high risk’’ results and hence quite different courses of future
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action . What is also becoming clear is the amount of interactional work required by
clinicians to render apparently precise numerical values (1 in X) less certain. Extract
3 is a further example of both these phenomena.
Extract 3
Context: The woman is 36 years old, and her risk result is 1:170. Both the woman and her  
husband are British. 
1. D2:  But this time, um (.) the result comes back to  
2.     be positive. 
3. H:  Right. 
4. D2:  °Okay?° Um: (.) it doesn’t mean that your baby 
5.    have Downs (.) It just means that um, the  
6.    chance that your baby has Downs is slightly  
7.    higher (.) okay? Uh um, what we estimate, the  
8.    estimation is based on your age (.) .hh um, 
9.    on the um (.) nuchal um translucency  
10.   measurement that we did (.) um on the fifth  
11.   of May.  
12.  H: Um huh 
13.  D2: And um also based on the blood test that  
14.   you had done on that day (.) Okay? And um  
15.   based on these, we estimated that (.) the  
16.   chance that this particular baby have Downs  
17.   syndrome is one out of hundred seventy..  
18. H: Right.= 
19. D2: =So that’s actually less than one percent  
20.  H: [Yeh]
21.  W: [Yeh] 
In this extract, following the statement of the ‘‘official’’ status in lines 1–2, the first
thing that the doctor says is what this result does not mean, i.e., a certainty. In other
words the ‘‘screen positive’’ status is immediately mitigated and attenuated over lines
4–7. The figure is also explicitly classed as an estimate in lines 7–8 before the ‘‘1 in
x’’ figure is produced in line 17–in this case 1 in 170. Here again, this is transformed
into a percentage using ‘‘loss framing’’ (O’Doherty and Suthers 2007:411). The
emphasis on the gradal particle ‘‘less’’ in this particular case serves to highlight
the numerically small value of this risk, indexing that the problem which has been
presented in this case does not necessarily reach a level where a problem-occasioned
reaction is necessary. In other words, a rationale is presented here that would readily
allow the couple to decline further testing, should they so wish. Once again in this
extract, there are minimal responses from the couple themselves. The preference for
‘‘auspicious interpretation’’ (Maynard 2006:1905) is again evident here, in that what
is officially ‘‘bad news’’ has the positive aspects of it emphasized by the doctor, and
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once again these positive aspects explicitly include the uncertainty of the result. On
a different but related theme, Lobb and Gaff (2010) have highlighted the certitude
that clients may attach to numerical results in genetic counseling. However, taken
together, Extracts 1–3 demonstrate the interactional work that clinicians do in this
setting to avoid making these results hearable as having a precise and definite status.
THE INESCAPABILITY OF UNCERTAINTY: UNCERTAIN TESTS
As we suggested at the outset, part of the difficulty that clinicians and prospective
parents face in this setting is that not only are results probabilistic, but the tests
from which the results come are of contested reliability. In talking with and about
uncertainty, this test-related uncertainty is a significant component. The way in
which the consultation reproduced in Extract 3 above continues shows how this
aspect of uncertainty becomes bound up with the clinician’s situating of the results.
The couple in this consultation are experiencing their fourth pregnancy and there is
a subsequent intervening discussion about how the results from this time compare
to last time and also about the timescales for diagnostic testing. At the end of this
sequence, a question from the husband topicalizes a discussion of the limitations of
the test.
Extract 4
303. H: Em, (.) is there (.) any benefit in redoing [blood tests?]   
304. D2:         [Blood tests]  
305.   Right.  
306. H: For in case (.) I mean I am not- basically I would say  
307.   that we are both committed to [do   ] a test no matter what 
308. D2:     [°Do. °] °Right.° ((nods)) 
309. H: But just, just to see if perhaps there was a slight (0.2) 
310.   emm (0.6) unusual result (.) or you think that [the over  ]all 
311. W:       [The thing is]
312.   we’ve already got a positive,
313. D2: [Yeh.] 
314. W: [So, ] we’re not gonna (.) even if we get a negative 
315.     next time we could go well, [oh! ] last time, 
316. D2:                    [Yeh] exactly.
317. W: I [mean] (.)=
318.  H:    [I] suppose
319. W:  =our peace of mind. 
320. D2:  Yes. ((nods)) 
321. W: That’s not gonna be. 
322. D2: [Yes] 
323. H: [Yeh] 
324.  W: until we do a s- a (.) 
325.  D2: Yes. 
326. W: diagnostic test. 
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327. D2: Yes. ((nods))
328. W: I think.
329. D2: Yes. Because I mean this is what we call a screening test. 
330.  H: [Yeh] ((nods)) 
331.  D2: [So ], you- you- you sometimes= 
332.  W: =it’s a likelihood isn’t it? [XX ] 
333.  D2:    [Yes,] it’s just a likelihood.  
334.  H: Yeh. 
335.  D2: So even if you do another test (.) it’s going to 
336.   give you another likelihood. (.) Maybe higher  
337.   than this one, or- or .h lower than this one. 
338.  H: Right. 
339.  D2: But it will not still be able to tell you for sure   
340.   that the baby doesn’t have a problem. 
341.  H: Yeh. 
342.  D2: Okay.
An implicit reference to the limitations of the blood tests can be inferred here
from the husband’s question whether his wife should take the blood tests again to
see if the initial report was ‘‘slight[ly] unusual’’ (lines 303, 309–310). The overlap
and the interruption by his wife (line 311) signal her resistance toward the husband’s
suggestion. As Hutchby (1996) notes, interruptions challenge the right of a current
speaker to take his or her turn to a completion point. Goldberg (1990) describes how
interruptions may be either affiliative or disaffiliative, and in this instance of the latter,
the pregnant woman goes on to explain that a subsequent negative result would not
put their mind at rest because it will not eliminate the previous positive result (lines
311–312; 314–315; 317; 319; 321). She suggests that a definitive result in the form of
a diagnostic test is needed (lines 324–326). While the woman is not affiliating with
her husband’s suggestion to redo the test, she is however aligning with the problem:
uncertain reliability of the screening tests. This problem means that a subsequent
test can be no more reliable than the current one. In line 327, the doctor concurs with
the woman’s proposal as to how certainty can be achieved and in line 329, she begins
an account of the nature of the results that can be obtained from the test the woman
has already undergone. When the woman offers the candidate understanding ‘‘It’s a
likelihood’’ followed by the tag question ‘‘isn’t it?’’ (line 332), the doctor’s response
downgrades this understanding even further with the mitigator ‘‘just’’—‘‘it’s just
a likelihood’’ (line 333). The doctor then expands this answer over lines 335–340
to include an explanation that goes further than this—it is not even a consistent
likelihood, so that the result may be different on different occasions. The only thing
that is presented as certain in this interaction, then, is that another screening test
cannot give certainty, and that certainty can only be gained from diagnostic testing.
What is also noteworthy in this extract is the more extensive nature of the
couple’s participation. We have previously noted that in primary care encounters,
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patients commonly withhold any assessment of diagnostic informations. Heath
(1992) suggests, however, that diagnoses that are presented as uncertain are much
more likely to elicit an extended response from patients and Pera¨kyla¨ (2006) has
extended this work by demonstrating that extended responses are more likely when
doctors account for their findings. We would suggest that where medical knowledge
is definitive, or is presented as definitive, patients may perceive there is nothing
to discuss. Equally, where uncertainty is presented straightforwardly as something
which needs to be definitively resolved through further medical action, as in Extract
1 here, there may be little to say. However, where medical science itself is known to
be uncertain and this uncertainty is topicalized, either the findings it produces or the
uncertainty itself may be the subject of discussion.
Our final example shows how the uncertainty of the test itself is raised in a more
specific way. In the extract below, maternal age arises as an issue in interpreting
test results, but this then leads into a topicalization of the limitations of the test in
quantitative terms.
Extract 5  
Context: The woman is 39 years old, and her risk is 1:117. She is from Mainland China, and  
attends the consultation on her own. She is employed as a teacher. The consultation is 
conducted in English, the second language for both participants.  
125. D3:  .h so it is not that when we scan the 
126.  neck folds –er very high (0.2) um (.) that’s  
127.  causing (.) the suspicion 
128. W: uh uhh it’s my age 
129. D3:  .hh it’s probably related to the – to the age  
130. P:  Mm 
131. D3:  ((clears throat)) But then um (0.3) you m-must  
132.  understand that this (.) cannot be hundred percent  
133. W:  Yeah. 
134. D3:  It’s about seventy percent detection, 
135. W. Mmm=
136. D3: = So (0.2) it’s (.) to see how concerned we are and  
137.  whether we would (.) prefer to (.) move on to other tests
138. W: Yeah [yeah]  
139. D3:  [to  ]  [confirm.] 
140. W:                    [I will] yeah yeah (.) I want to do another test.. 
At the beginning of this sequence, following the delivery of the ‘‘1 in X’’ result
(not shown here for reasons of space) the doctor has been giving an ‘‘auspicious
interpretation’’ (Maynard 2006:1905) of the test results. She does this by focusing on
one key factor in the calculation—the nuchal fold measurement—which is in the
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normal range (lines 125–127). As Maynard (2006) notes, troubles can arise when a
clinician affirms the positive aspects of results, but the patient subsequently takes
this positive interpretation too far. In this case, the pregnant woman produces a
candidate explanation (Pomerantz 1988) for the results—her age (she will be forty
by the end of her pregnancy)—but this explanation is produced as a certainty. In
response, the doctor reformulates this specific statement more tentatively in line 129,
with hedging and the use of ‘‘probably.’’ In her subsequent turn, she then introduces
the general uncertainty of the tests as an explanation—that the results cannot
be 100% accurate. Through use of the formulation ‘‘you must understand,’’ the
doctor explicitly addresses the perceived assumption from the patient that medical
knowledge can be certain about this. Her talk makes clear that such certainty cannot
be guaranteed and so deciding on any further action requires an acceptance of this
uncertainty. An approximate figure is then put on the accuracy of the test in line
134—about 70%. The use of the upshot marker ‘‘so’’ (Robinson 2006) acts as a
topic modifier in that it shifts the discussion towards a formulation of a summary of
what should happen next (Heritage and Watson 1979). The uncertainty surrounding
the screening test is alluded to again here by framing the diagnostic testing as a
way of confirming the diagnosis (lines 137–139), though in contrast to Extract 1
this is treated here as a matter of preference rather than necessity. What ‘‘should
happen next’’ is decision making about diagnostic testing and the pregnant woman
subsequently makes this decision in line 141. The issue as presented here, then, is
whether this level of certainty is sufficient for the woman, and the balance between
level of concern and level of uncertainty. In other words, it is localized (Sarangi
et al. 2003) to her particular situation. As a result of this localization, however, the
responsibility for choice in this situation is clearly shifted to the pregnant woman.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a number of different ways in which uncertainty
is talked about and with, but we would suggest that bringing them all together
highlights some key points.
First, and most obviously, uncertainty is a key issue pervading these data and this
uncertainty has to be interactionally managed. The way that results are produced for
antenatal screening tests means that all of the medical uncertainty surrounding the
test is initially brought to bear in one single ‘‘1 in x’’ figure, which may potentially be
hearable as having a very precise status (Lobb and Gaff 2010). In the consultations
in our corpus, doctors and nurses do a great deal of work to make sure that the ‘‘1
in x’’ result is not heard in this way, for example, through the use of hedging or
explicitly describing the result as an estimation.
Second, we have identified different ways in which uncertainty manifests itself
in these interactions. Imprecise and noncommitting formulations are routinely used
by clinicians to signal the fact that the screening test results cannot be taken
as definitive; here uncertainty is talked with. These formulations can contribute
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to reassuring patients, or to indicating that the problem presented by a ‘‘screen
positive’’ result may not be of sufficient magnitude to require a problem-occasioned
response. However, uncertainty can also become a topic in its own right, and is
talked about in discussions over the limits of what medical science can provide in
this context, or in a more explicit addressing of the significance of the problem that
is presented by a screen positive result. What is particularly interesting is that this
uncertainty can be marshaled on different occasions by clinicians as a resource either
to indicate a need for further testing, or more commonly to indicate that not to test
further would be a reasonable response.
Third, in some consultations clinicians could be said to be taking an expert position
to evaluate numerical evidence in the context of the case at hand by describing
things as ‘‘not so high,’’ or ‘‘a bit high,’’ or telling clients not to worry—this provides
meaning by placing these specific results in the context of their wider experience
of these kinds of results. Research in other settings has suggested that one way
clinicians manage uncertainty is with recourse to the boundaries of their own
medical specialty, i.e., by suggesting that what is uncertain to a geneticist might be
better be answered by a neurologist or other specialists (Sarangi and Clarke 2002).
In this setting, however, there is no-one better placed to manage the uncertainty
and so we would argue that a significant part of clinicians’ professionalism in this
setting is demonstrated through conveying the grounds for uncertainty in terms
of the limitations of the tests. At the same time as conveying that it is a lack of
medical knowledge per se (rather than a lack of their own knowledge) that is the
issue, doctors draw on a variety of resources in locating this uncertainty within
what is medically known. These resources include notions of range and normalcy
in describing the test results, and localization to a woman’s specific circumstances.
However, as we have shown, a consequence of this emphasis on uncertainty as an
inescapable part of knowledge in this setting means that the burden of responsibility
for decision making may be shifted to the pregnant woman, on the grounds that the
essential issue to be decided on is how much uncertainty she can tolerate.
We have also seen that responses by pregnant women and/or their partners to
the delivery of screening results may be very minimal, as is also the case in primary
care diagnostics (Heath 1992; Pera¨kyla¨ 2006). Both Heath and Pera¨kyla¨ have noted
that there is an association between the presence of uncertainty in consultations and
more extended patient responses, and this is also evident in these data. We would
suggest that this is in part because it allows the nature of the uncertainty itself to
become a topic for discussion, as well as the nature of the results.
Lastly, Maynard (2006) has noted a tendency for what he calls ‘‘auspicious inter-
pretation’’ in medical settings—downplaying the negative aspects while emphasizing
the positive ones. In part, this deals with the difficulty of intersubjectivity that clini-
cians face, in that what they might perceive as ordinary or routine might be perceived
as an emergency or crisis by a patient (Hughes 1951). Such auspicious interpretation
is commonly seen when dealing with the uncertain nature of results in this setting.
However, we began by noting that Davis (1960) has also suggested that uncertainty
204 Symbolic Interaction Volume 37, Number 2, 2014
can be used by doctors to serve functional purposes and the data presented here
clearly illustrate how uncertainty can indeed be a useful interactional resource in
practice; it can be talked with as well as about. Whilst it can be used to underline the
case for testing, it is more commonly used in this setting to facilitate positive framing:
since the result is uncertain, it can always and truthfully be claimed that it might be
nothing to worry about. As we have shown, there may be good interactional reasons
for this kind of presentation, but there remains a practical problem in the clinic. The
cutoff point for what are considered ‘‘high risk’’ results in this setting are 1 in 250,
or 1 in 350, depending on the combination of tests. This equates to percentages of
approximately 0.4 or 0.29, and as the doctors in Extracts 2 and 3 suggest, figures
of this magnitude (less than 1%) may generally be viewed as small. The ‘‘essential
tension’’ (Mazeland and ten Have 1996) is that women are placed in a high risk
category and recalled to the clinic on the basis of these figures, but the same figures
are then used interactionally to emphasise the small mathematical nature of the risk.
At the outset of this article we noted Katz’s (1984) view that strategies doctors have
developed for coping with uncertainty lead them to disregard or avoid it. By contrast,
what seems to occur in this setting is that doctors foreground uncertainty as a means
to deal interactionally with the fact that these women have been officially placed
into an institutional category of high risk. It would be interesting to consider the
functional role uncertainty plays in women with screening results of a much greater
magnitude, e.g., 1 in 30, and to explore whether it is afforded such a prominent
interactional role.
We have taken an interactional perspective in the analysis presented here, and
as we noted at the outset, there is little work on the interactional manifestations of
uncertainty. However, it is also important to note that the phenomena we identify
are not only of interactional interest. We would argue that these differences in
the use of uncertainty as an interactional resource can also be critical for practice,
and for the wider sociological and ethical debate about the role and function of
antenatal screening (Pilnick 2008). As Maynard and Frankel (2006) have noted,
whether diagnostic information is marked as good, bad or uncertain matters not
only for delivery but also for receipt: what these women will make of what they
are told and whether they will subsequently decide to pursue diagnostic testing.
Women’s choices are likely to be influenced not only by the screening test results
themselves but also how those results are presented to them (Michie et al. 2003).
In examining this issue, a continued focus on talk about and with uncertainty
is needed.
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NOTES
1. In genetic counseling, a nondirective approach is adopted as a standard of professional practice.
It calls for nonimposing presentation of information to clients in order to enable them to make
an autonomous and informed decision.
2. We use the term Down’s syndrome (as opposed to Down syndrome) in line with the practices
of the hospital where this research has been conducted.
3. A first-trimester screening test is offered to women between 11 and 13.6 weeks of gestation.
It includes the measurement of the fetal nuchal translucency and a blood test for two serum
markers (hCG and PAPP-A) and has a detection rate of 80–90%. A second-trimester test is
performed between 16 and 19.6 weeks of gestation and includes a blood test for two serum
markers (hCG and AFP) with a detection rate of 60–70%. An integrated test includes the
measurement of the fetal nuchal translucency in the first trimester and blood test for hCG and
AFP in the second trimester. It offers the same detection rate as the first-trimester screening
test, but with a lower false positive rate (Lam et al., 2000; Leung et al., 2004).
4. In all data extracts, the names of the participants and other identifiers have been removed.
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